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The CCP strongly opposes a formal declaration of independence from Taiwan, and has 
threatened military force should Taiwan take that step. This paper seeks to explain the 
underlying reasons for the CCP’s aggressive policy. To do so, it uses a two-part methodology 
composed of a comprehensive engagement with existing secondary sources from the academic 
literature and four new interviews with experts in the field. The paper considers three main 
explanations for China’s opposition to independence: nationalism, international geostrategic 
factors, and factors of domestic politics. It concludes that domestic politics, and specifically the 
CCP’s perception that independence threatens its claim to legitimacy, constitutes the main driver 
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Upon first glance, the key factor driving the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 
opposition to Taiwanese independence may seem fairly obvious. After all, official Chinese 
policy and rhetoric make it quite clear that the CCP views Taiwan as historically being a part of 
China that on principle belongs to the mainland. While this overt justification may indeed play a 
large role in the internal deliberations of party leaders, such a conclusion should not be 
automatic. Particularly given the significant domestic and international issues at stake in 
cross-strait relations, blindly accepting the official line on the CCP’s opposition to Taiwanese 
independence risks naively missing the larger issues at stake.  
Nor is the endeavor to fully understand CCP motivations regarding Taiwan a trivial 
academic exercise. While China’s commitment to preventing Taiwanese independence cannot be 
doubted, the precise reasoning underlying that commitment has vast importance for both 
appreciating Chinese strategy and crafting a strategy in response. If China sees Taiwan as 
primarily a potential buffer state, efforts to significantly de-escalate tensions in the Asia-Pacific 
may meaningfully reduce China’s need for aggressive posturing toward Taiwan. If, however, 
China sees the importance of Taiwan as primarily cultural or historical, such efforts will have 
little to no success. Similarly, China’s response to a hypothetical grand bargain (Glaser 2015) 
involving Taiwan and the East and South China Seas would depend almost entirely on the main 
motivations driving CCP policy in Taiwan. Ultimately, attempting to predict the CCP’s response 
to any potential US strategy regarding Taiwan will remain fruitless until the party’s opposition to 
independence can be fully deciphered.  
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As a result, my research attempts to answer the following question: why is the Chinese 
Communist Party so deeply committed to preventing formal Taiwanese independence? This 
differs from an analysis of the CCP’s strategy regarding Taiwan, which can be more easily 
determined (attempting to encourage reunification by making Taiwan dependent on China and 
isolated from the rest of the world). Moreover, this research question differs from looking at the 
surface level motivations behind such specific strategies. Rather, this research question looks at 
the deeper, primary factors that motivate the CCP’s overall orientation toward Taiwan, and 
specifically, its firm opposition to formal independence. 
Literature Review 
Despite what may appear to be agreement that deep nationalism drives Chinese foreign 
policy toward Taiwan, the literature on the issue reveals serious divides. Three primary theories 
emerge, each with distinct subgroups. The conventional approach sees the CCP’s deep 
commitment to preventing independence as a “sacred commitment.” This theory adheres to the 
nationalist narrative, and sees the commitment to Taiwan as primarily principled, or born out of 
some sort of a-rational view of Taiwan’s cultural importance (Moore, 2016). Even among 
scholars who agree that cultural considerations dominate, disagreement exists as to the precise 
character of those considerations. Most simply, some argue that CCP leaders see Taiwan as a 
historical part of China that can therefore never be separated from it (Mengin, 2020). Others 
point to Taiwan’s specific history as the last refuge of the Chinese Nationalist Party, and 
therefore see reunification as necessary to finally conclude the Chinese Civil War (Marschik, 
2018). Still others contend that the Century of Humiliation gives Taiwan specific importance as 
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an example of a piece of land that China has been denied control over by Westerners (Bergsten 
et. al, 2009). Finally, some argue that the CCP overemphasizes the importance of  Taiwan 
because unification would unite the entire Han Chinese race under one government (Jacobs, 
2008). 
A second theoretical approach focuses on pragmatic international geopolitical concerns. 
Such theorists frequently refer to Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and emphasize its 
strategic importance for military operations (Nathan, 1996; Wallman, 2007). The potential 
strategic advantages that come from holding Taiwan include preventing further American 
containment, stronger positioning in the South China Sea, enhanced defensive naval capacity, 
and key positioning in maritime trade routes (Marschik, 2018). Different scholars emphasize 
different advantages in making the realist case for China’s commitment to Taiwan, with 
potentially crucial implications. 
A final theoretical approach sees the CCP commitment to Taiwan as driven by pragmatic 
domestic considerations. Two clear branches of this thinking exist. The first version of the theory 
contends that the CCP fears a domino effect, in which Tibetan, Uighur, and Mongolian secession 
movements would be bolstered by the symbolic exit of Taiwan from China (Lee, 2011; Mengin, 
2020). According to these theorists, Taiwanese independence would send a signal of CCP 
weakness and inability to control its borders that would make holding the rest of the country 
together nearly impossible. A second theory essentially contends that the Chinese public believes 
in the nationalist perspective that Taiwan belongs to China and that allowing Taiwan to become 
independent would be evidence of an inability of the CCP to govern effectively (Shirk, 2007). 
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Knowing this, CCP leaders fear a legitimacy crisis and popular uprising in the event of 
Taiwanese independence. 
None of these theories are mutually exclusive, and some do contend that a combination 
of factors play significant roles (Friedman, 2007). Yet the possibility for overlap should not 
negate the real disagreement present in the literature. Adherents to the sacred commitments 
theory tend to downplay the importance of security considerations and vice versa. This paper 
intends to determine which factors really matter to China, and which cannot really explain the 
extent and nature of the CCP’s opposition to Taiwanese independence.  
Research Methodology 
This paper proceeds using a two-part methodology. The paper relies primarily on the 
secondary sources that make up the existing scholarly literature on the China-Taiwan 
relationship. A majority of these sources come from the academic world, including multiple 
books and quite a few academic journal articles. One book comes from a former US diplomat 
who has since produced academic work, and a number of think tank reports have been consulted. 
While nearly all of these sources come from the field of international relations, a few sources 
from other disciplines, such as history, have been included. 
The paper also relies on primary sources in the form of four qualitative interviews. 
Experts were contacted via email on the basis of the relevance of their research interests. Efforts 
were made to include experts from differing national perspectives due to the many parties with a 
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stake in the China-Taiwan relationship. These efforts saw success, as interviews were conducted 
with experts at universities in France, China, and the United States. 
All interviewees received information on the nature of the research project before 
agreeing to participate. Some interviewees requested to see the quotations that would be used 
from their interviews and were provided with that information. No interviewee requested 
anonymity, requested the exclusion of any of their comments, or raised any ethical concerns at 
any point in the process. 
This paper proceeds by categorizing the types of evidence that scholars have used to 
assess Chinese motivations with regards to Taiwan. It then analyzes the quality of the evidence 
supporting each of the different theories found in the literature. Finally, it concludes by assessing 
the relative strength of each theory on the basis of the amassed evidence. 
Analysis 
Types of Evidence 
Determining the underlying motivations that ground Chinese foreign policy represents a 
uniquely difficult challenge. Often described as a “black box,” the Chinese foreign policy 
decision-making process allows few opportunities for Western observers to even ascertain which 
actors hold decision-making power, let alone the rationale those actors employ (James and 
Zhang, 2005). In this opaque context, researchers must do their best to use what little clues they 
have available to make educated guesses regarding Chinese motivations. While a litany of 
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potential methodologies exist to support such guesswork, four types of evidence emerge in the 
literature as most likely to yield glimmers of the truth.  
First, researchers can look to rhetorical choices used in both the official public statements 
and the private writings and conversations of Chinese leaders. Evidence derived from the actual 
statements of Chinese officials has the advantage of offering the clearest and simplest window 
into Chinese decision-making. Serious questions can and should be raised, however, regarding 
the extent to which the public beliefs of Chinese leaders match their private beliefs. Because of 
China’s one-party system, leaders essentially must tow the party line or abandon their political 
future. In this context, claims about genuine Chinese motivations that attempt to use statements 
as evidence can be grouped into three tiers of strength. The strongest claims derive from the rare 
public statements that express views counter to the party orthodoxy, because the ulterior motive 
of party conformity actually deters the speaker from making such statements. The next strongest 
claims derive from private statements, where officials may feel more comfortable speaking 
freely, although demands for conformity likely exist even behind closed doors. The weakest 
claims derive from public statements that conform to party orthodoxy, although even these 
statements should count as evidence particularly when specific phrases or words see frequent 
repetition.  
Second, researchers can look to expert evaluation. This methodology essentially boils 
down to a form of intellectual modesty, recognizing that any individual researcher may be unable 
to single-handling decipher Chinese motivation better than their peers. Additionally, solid 
academic research supports the notion that “groups are remarkably intelligent, and are often 
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smarter than the smartest people in them” (Suroweicki, 2005, pg. xiii). Specifically, Suroweicki 
finds that aggregating group answers to complex questions, like what motivates China, yields 
much more accurate results than taking any particular individual’s answer, no matter their 
qualification. 
Third, researchers can look to contextual factors. This approach sees the question of the 
motivations grounding Chinese opposition to Taiwanese independence as far too narrow. Claims 
that use this approach use evidence based on how China typically behaves and argues that China 
probably behaves consistently with regard to Taiwan. For example, a scholar might argue that 
China has a generally revisionist orientation to the liberal order and that its foreign policy toward 
Taiwan must fit within its general revisionist orientation. The strength of claims derived from 
context depends heavily on the strength of the corresponding claim about context. If extremely 
strong evidence can be shown that Chinese leaders exhibit a generally pragmatic worldview, 
claims that China regards Taiwan ideologically would be significantly weakened. Even the 
strongest contextual claims cannot be considered conclusive, however, because they fail to 
account for the specific features of the Taiwan dispute, which has several unique characteristics 
that differentiate from all other policy areas.  
Fourth, researchers can make inferences regarding motivations that derive from actions. 
Inferential evidence analyzes the strategic choices that China has made with regards to Taiwan, 
and attempts to determine what motivation sets would justify those choices. This evidence can be 
a powerful tool to rule out particular theories, as it can demonstrate a clear inconsistency 
between a potential motivation and actual behavior. Inferential evidence rarely can provide 
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positive proof for a particular theory, however, as multiple motivation sets could plausibly justify 
nearly any action. Furthermore, inferential evidence requires researchers to impose a certain 
view of rationality onto China, because researchers must use their personal judgment to 
determine which actions would be consistent with a given motivation.  
The Conventional View 
The conventional view on the motivations grounding CCP’s opposition to formal 
Taiwanese independence contends that its leaders adhere to a nationalist belief that Taiwan is 
rightfully a part of China. Every different scholar understands the ideology behind this 
nationalism slightly differently. Some emphasize China’s belief in Taiwan has historically been a 
part of China (Mengin, 2020), others emphasize retaking Taiwan as the final piece required to 
finish the Chinese Civil War (Jacques, 2009; Marschik, 2018), still others emphasize Taiwan’s 
role in the Century of Humiliation (Bergsten et al., 2009), and a final group emphasizes racial 
unity (Jacobs, 2008). Despite disagreeing over the emphasis of these factors, almost all of these 
scholars would agree that each plays at least some role in Taiwan’s particular place in Chinese 
nationalism.  
Rhetorical Evidence 
Because the nationalist theory closely mirrors the official Chinese explanation for its 
opposition to Taiwanese independence, it’s no surprise that official Chinese statements largely 
support this theory. Moore (2016) cites seven different instances in which Chinese leaders, 
including Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, made a statement on the Taiwan issue that justified 
China’s interest in Taiwan on nationalist grounds. Specifically, Moore found that Chinese 
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leaders frequently referred to reunification as a “sacred commitment,” a loose ideological 
concept that he sees as unifying the various different strands of nationalist concern for Taiwan. 
Current President Xi Jinping appeared to espouse the same core philosophy in a 2019 speech in 
which he claimed that “unification between the two sides of the strait is the great trend of 
history” (Buckley and Horton, 2019). The evidence from official public statements seems to 
unequivocally support the nationalist theory. All of this rhetorical evidence, however, is of the 
weakest kind as it exclusively consists of public statements that adhere to party orthodoxy. 
Expert Evidence 
The nationalist theory appears to be the closest theory to achieving expert consensus. 
Moore interviewed 28 Chinese experts on cross-strait relations and asked them to assign 
percentages of emphasis to the different motivations of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan. 
Experts could, for example, put 80% of their emphasis on desires to end the Century of 
Humiliation and 20% on desires to achieve better access to maritime trade routes. Moore found 
that experts gave 49.4% of the total emphasis to nationalist motivations, significantly more than 
any other factor. Moore (2020) claims that one fourth of his sample of experts were “people who 
would be in the room at the PRC” while the other three quarters were “academics with their ears 
to the ground.” Moore did not quantitatively measure whether the government officials gave 
significantly different answers from the academics, but he says that the both groups primarily 
emphasized nationalist motivations. 
Although Moore classifies the government officials as experts, their responses really 
provide private rhetorical evidence than expert evidence. Moore never identifies the identities of 
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his interviewees, so the government officials may have felt relatively capable of speaking freely, 
although they may still have felt some pressure to tow the party line either because they feared 
their responses would be discovered or because of a genuine desire to propagate the official 
narrative. As such, the responses from government officials should be understood as equivalent 
to evidence of the private conversations of government officials: medium strength rhetorical 
evidence. 
The academic responses fit much more cleanly as expert evidence. These academics, all 
based in China, probably have access to some information and cultural understanding that 
Western observers lack. Moreover, their relative uniformity provides evidence that the 
nationalist theory is not only the conventional view, but the consensus view. Finally, the 
aggregation of their responses into a single average serves as exactly the type of group 
knowledge production that Suroweicki contends produces better results than individualized 
analysis. 
Contextual Evidence 
Some fairly strong contextual evidence supports the nationalism theory. One broad 
perspective contends that China must be seen as a civilization-state rather than a nation-state 
(Jacques, 2009). Jacques writes that “when the Chinese use the term ‘China’ they are not usually 
referring to the country or nation so much as Chinese civilization – its history, the dynasties, 
Confucius...and distinctive philosophy” (pg. 196). Viewing China as a civilization-state means 
that “China” did not begin with the founding of the PRC in 1949, but with the founding of the 
Zhou dynasty thousands of years ago. This classification has profound implications for its 
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modern day policy-making. Jacques notes that because the Chinese adopt this unique 
civilizational perspective, “there are no other people in the world who are so connected to their 
past” (pg. 197). The civilizational perspective creates a continuous view of Chinese history, 
amplifying the importance of historical China in the psyche of the Chinese people. The 
civilizational perspective also comes with a particular conception of the role of the state. Within 
a civilization-state, “the state, most importantly of all, has the sacred task of maintaining the 
unity of Chinese civilization” (pg. 199).  
Viewed through the lens of the civilization-state, the nationalist narrative becomes 
extremely clear. Both the emphasis on the historical continuity of the Chinese civilization and 
the state’s primary goal of preserving unity make Taiwanese independence an absolute travesty 
from a civilization-state perspective. Indeed, Jacques adheres to the nationalist theory. 
Specifically, he believes the CCP sees Taiwan as “unfinished business, the only incomplete item 
on the Party’s civil war agenda” (pg. 299). According to Jacques, the historical conflict around 
China amplifies Taiwan’s status as a lost territory and therefore a threat to the state's primary 
objective of maintaining unity.  
The International Geostrategy Theory 
In a sharp break from the nationalist theory, the international geostrategy theory views 
CCP leaders as eminently pragmatic. Adherents argue that Chinese leaders value Taiwan 
primarily because of its inherent geostrategic value. Just as proponents of the nationalist theory 
disagree about the precise reason that Taiwan attracts nationalist fervor, different explanations 
for the primary geostrategic value of Taiwan exist as well. Common explanations include 
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China’s desire to use Taiwan as a bridgehead to achieve broader regional hegemony in the 
Asia-Pacific, as a buffer against American containment, as an access point to maritime trade 
routes, and as an enabler of breakout capacity for its submarine fleet. The most prominent 
proponent of the international geostrategy theory actually contends that all of these factors play a 
role, and add up to making Taiwan an essential geographic resource for China (Wachman, 2007). 
Rhetorical Evidence 
     Wachman provides by far the strongest defense of the international geostrategy theory 
in the literature, and he builds his case on rhetorical evidence. Citing a litany of PLA officials, he 
shows that the Chinese military has thought long and hard about the strategic value of Taiwan. 
For example, he cites Major General Peng Guangqian of the PRC Academy of Military Sciences 
as saying ​“Taiwan is a keystone for China to cross the Pacific and go out to the world. It is an 
important strategic space that affects national security and national rejuvenation, and affects 
China’s external transformational links, trade links, and oil energy transportation links” (pg. 
144). He also cites Lou Yuan, a Senior Colonel at the PRC Academy of Military Sciences, 
claiming that “only the seas to the east of Taiwan allow China direct access to the great strategic 
passages of the Pacific. If this opening to the sea is controlled by other countries, China’s 
maritime development strategy will be severely hampered. However, if the two sides of the 
straight unify...China’s maritime development strategy will vigorously flourish and rise.” (pg. 
30). These two excerpts represent only a small selection of Wachman’s rigorous research, which 




At a first glance, the rhetorical evidence for the international geostrategy theory far 
exceeds the rhetorical evidence for the nationalist theory. Because the international geostrategy 
theory does not conform to the official party line, and perhaps even runs afoul of it, the evidence 
from the PLA should be treated as highly genuine. Yet at the end of his book, Wachman makes a 
concession in the name of modesty that ultimately undermines much of his work: 
One can be fairly certain that the most senior leaders in the PRC are well acquainted with 
the geostrategic arguments that are advanced about the centrality of Taiwan and its 
salience as a means of puncturing the U.S. island-based cordon. One does not know, 
though, whether it is the logic of that argument or some other that impels them to 
coercive diplomatic measures and an increasingly militarized stance toward Taiwan. One 
cannot know whether they are moved primarily by the nationalistic arguments that have 
been the mainstay of the PRC’s declaratory policy or whether they...see the quest for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as a means to grander strategic ends” (pg. 160). 
 
Wachman deserves credit for honestly admitting what his evidence fails to prove. Yet this caveat 
is no mere asterisk at the end of his work, but a devastating concession. Wachman quotes almost 
exclusively from the PLA, rather than the PRC broadly, and provides no evidence that the PLA 
has shaped broader policy-making. Although the PLA undoubtedly wields tremendous influence, 
the exclusion of other decision-makers creates a clear bias toward the military justifications for 
taking Taiwan. The PLA would be negligent if they did not investigate the strategic concerns 
surrounding Taiwan, and simply noting that they have done so extensively does not amount to 
much of an argument that such concerns constitute primary drivers of policy. 
Expert Evidence 
Although no corollary to Moore’s quantitative study of expert attitudes exists among 
advocates of international geostrategy theory, a significant number of scholars have voiced 
support for the Wachman’s thesis. Cole (2008), reviewing Wachman’s book, notes that 
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“Wachman does succeed in demonstrating that many of China’s current military strategists, both 
academics and military officers, view Taiwan’s importance in geostrategic terms.”  Kastner 
(2010) adds that “Wachman does an outstanding job of weaving together a narrative showing 
that strategic concerns have often factored into debates and decisions concerning Taiwan.” Most 
enthusiastically, Nathan (2008) gushes that “Alan Wachman's answer to this puzzle is the most 
persuasive I have seen.” While nearly all these reviewers have some reservations about aspects 
of Wachman’s argument, some experts clearly do share Wachman’s overall view that 
international geostrategic concerns dominate. 
Contextual Evidence 
Contextual evidence does exist to support the international geopolitics theory, although 
its claims have been highly contested. Some scholars argue that China exhibits the characteristics 
of an offensive realist state, meaning that it acts aggressively in order to preserve its own security 
(Li, 2016; Mearshimer, 2015). If offensive realism does characterize China, then China would be 
expected to view international conflicts through the lens of its potential strategic gains and 
vulnerabilities. Realism would invalidate the nationalist view because it entails a purely 
pragmatic and non-ideological outlook. While it would not necessarily refute the domestic 
politics theory, realism would suggest that China sees international threats as larger obstacles to 
its survival. 
This theory has many detractors, however. Meijer (2020) says that “​China is not a 
revisionist power. Beijing is not trying to overthrow the system. Rather, China is engaged in a 
selective contestation of the international order in the Asia-Pacific and in general​.” China has 
indeed participated in a number of multilateral agreements and benefited greatly from the 
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international order that it participates in. The realist worldview appears highly reductive and has 
difficulty explaining many of modern China’s behaviors. Still, as a prominent theory in 
international relations that would greatly support the international geostrategy theory, it deserves 
consideration. 
The Domestic Politics Theory 
The third and final theory contends that the CCP’s opposition to Taiwanese independence 
hinges not on foreign policy at all, but on domestic concerns. At first glance, the theory has much 
in common with the nationalist theory, because domestic politics theory proponents agree that 
the Chinese population as a whole holds deeply nationalist attitudes toward Taiwan. Whereas the 
nationalist theory holds that Chinese leadership shares those attitudes, the domestic politics 
theory envisions Chinese leadership as pragmatists who see their CCP rule as deeply threatened 
by a public backlash to letting Taiwan secede. As with both other theories, different scholars 
defend slightly different versions of the theory. One version of the theory, which could be 
described as the “domino theory,” holds that Chinese leaders fear that formal Taiwanese 
independence could send a signal of CCP weakness that would foment further secessionist 
movements in other border territories (Lee, 2009; Friedman, 2011; Mengin, 2020). Scholars most 
frequently cite Tibet and Xinjiang as potential areas of concern, although Chinese leaders may 
also worry about Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, and Macao.  
A second version of the domestic politics theory might be called the “legitimacy theory.” 
The legitimacy theory contends that the CCP believes that the broader legitimacy of their rule 
would evaporate if it failed to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. Proponents of this 
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theory tend to see the potential legitimacy crisis posed by Taiwan as a self-fulfilling prophecy 
fueled by previous generations of Chinese leaders. Friedman (2007) describes Mao and 
subsequent leaders ratcheting up nationalism targeted at Taiwan in order to distract from the 
CCP’s domestic troubles. Although Mao privately admitted that Taiwan did not historically 
belong to China, “a certain level of military tensions served Mao's interests...He wanted to keep a 
civil war alive” (pg. 122). This policy of using Taiwan as a diversion from domestic troubles 
continued beyond Mao. Ultimately, Friedman argues that “virtually all analysts agree, the CCP 
responded to a legitimation crisis by manufacturing causes for patriotic support. Taiwan, as in 
1958, was targeted to serve domestic CCP purposes” (pg. 126). Unfortunately for the CCP, 
continually justifying its legitimacy on the basis of the Taiwan issue has predictably made its 
claim to legitimacy entirely dependent on the success of the party’s Taiwan policy. The 
population has fully bought into the CCP’s manufactured narrative that the primary purpose of 
the Chinese state is uniting China with Taiwan. Friedman writes that during the 1990’s, “power 
holders in Beijing were continually under pressure to do more against Taiwan” (pg. 128). Such 
pressures continued into the twenty-first century and made it impossible for CCP leaders to back 
down: “Hu Jintao has had little room for maneuver in the direction of peace. ‘No Chinese leader 
wants to risk being accused of 'losing' Taiwan on his watch’” (pg. 132). While not all adherents 
to the legitimacy theory see the historical progression exactly as Friedman does, the broad story 




Broadly speaking, public official rhetoric provides neither evidence for nor against the 
domestic politics theory. The domestic politics theory would expect to see nearly all public 
official rhetoric espousing the nationalist theory, because leaders have to uphold their image of 
defending and promoting Chinese nationalism. Yet because such rhetoric also obviously supports 
the nationalist theory itself, public official rhetoric provides little help to scholars deciding 
between the nationalist theory and the domestic politics theory. Glaser (2020) still sees a glimpse 
of evidence in Xi Jinping’s speech at the National Party Congress. In the speech, Xi directly 
linked unification with Taiwan to “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xinhua, 2017). 
Xi has predicted his defense of CCP stability on achieving that rejuvenation, and so Glaser sees 
that linkage as potential evidence that Xi sees unification with Taiwan as necessary for CCP 
legitimacy.  
Shirk (2007) provides access to some private CCP rhetoric that strongly bolsters domestic 
politics theory. She interviewed two retired anonymous PLA officers about their worries 
stemming from a potential declaration of independence, and quotes one as saying “people have 
very strong feelings about the Taiwan issue. If leaders stand by and do nothing while Taiwan 
declares independence, the Chinese Communist Party will fall” (pg. 181). Notably, these officers 
actually tried to brainstorm ways that China could justify backing down, implying strongly that if 
not for domestic pressures, they would be happy to let Taiwan secede. Such statements provide 
nearly incontrovertible evidence that the domestic politics theory describes the mindset of at 
least these two officers. Shirk only interviews three PLA officers, however, and like Wachman, 
fails to show that their thinking has any influence in the broader PRC policy-making realm. Due 
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to that failure, rhetoric does not provide much evidence for the domestic politics theory more 
broadly. 
Expert Evidence 
Although Moore’s study of expert opinion primarily supports the nationalist theory, it 
also provides some solace to defenders of the domestic politics theory. Moore found 28.5% of 
the experts’ emphasis was placed on the domestic politics theory (21.2% for the legitimacy 
theory; 7.3% for the domino theory) in comparison to the 49.4% for the nationalist theory. When 
asked about how he interprets the steep division, he says that he “expects to see that complexity 
as a constructionist because that's the way the social milieu really is” (Moore 2020). Although 
that complexity certainly should not be downplayed, these results might also be interpreted as 
somewhat inconclusive. Moore chooses to bundle all the different strands of nationalist theory 
into one quantitative category, while separating two different versions of the domestic politics 
theory. If Moore had individually measured all four different versions of the nationalist theory, 
he might have found none achieved greater emphasis than the 21.2% of emphasis for the 
legitimacy theory. Moore’s paper argues that the concept of “sacred commitments” unites the 
different strains of the nationalist theory and justifies their grouping, but one could also argue 
that concepts like “pragmatism” unite even the domestic politics theory and the international 
geostrategy theory. If the debate is conceived of as sacred commitments vs. pragmatism, both 
interpreted broadly, pragmatism likely accounts for over 50% of the emphasis (although 12% of 
the emphasis is unaccounted for in Moore’s paper).  
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Unlike Moore, Shirk does not attempt a quantitative or aggregative survey of China 
observers. She does, however, quote nine different experts who defend the domestic politics 
theory in some fashion. Additionally, three of the experts contacted for this paper supported the 
domestic politics theory (Glaser, 2020; Mengin, 2020; Meijer, 2020). The interviewees for this 
paper were not selected randomly, and Shirk may have omitted quotations from interviewees that 
defended other theories. Still, significant expert support for the domestic politics theory clearly 
exists. 
Contextual Evidence 
Strong contextual evidence supports the domestic politics theory. Zhao (2008) describes 
Chinese leadership as adopting a philosophy of pragmatic nationalism. This philosophy 
“does not have a fixed, objectified, and eternally defined content, nor is it driven by any 
ideology, religion beliefs or other abstract ideas. It is an instrument of the communist 
state to bolster faith of the Chinese people in a political system in trouble and hold the 
country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation from a 
communist to a post-communist society” (Zhao, 2008, pg. 3). 
Zhao seeks to support this account of Chinese pragmatic nationalism with an appeal to history. 
He interprets Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote, that “a cat, whether it is white or black, is a good 
one as long as it is able to catch mice”, as pragmatism epitomized. Deng rejected ideological 
communism and instead advocated pragmatic market reforms that transformed China into an 
economic powerhouse. Zhao cites numerous modern cases of Chinese leaders choosing a 
pragmatic option over strict ideological adherence in foreign policy contexts. In one particularly 
illuminating example from 2001, after a US plane collided into a Chinese plane, the Chinese 
government took a strong public stance demanding an apology to stave off domestic nationalist 
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pressures. The US Secretary of State used the phrase “very sorry” to reflect that he found the 
situation regrettable, but did not actually apologize for the incident. Chinese leaders intentionally 
misinterpreted the phrase and accepted the non-apology, demonstrating their demand for an 
apology had been an act of pragmatic domestic politics rather than genuine nationalist anger. 
Yeung (2019) adds further context to this view, showing that the CCP has frequently and 
consciously stoked nationalism to achieve legitimacy. Like all authoritarian regimes, the CCP 
faces the difficult task of justifying its rule to the public. Yeung argues that the CCP has 
historically relied on ideological legitimacy derived from communism and performance 
legitimacy derived from economic growth. Eventually, however, ​“in view of the shortcomings of 
both ideological legitimacy and performance legitimacy, the CCP regime realised that 
nationalism is the strongest weapon in legitimising its rule over the country” (Yeung, 2019). 
Yeung applies this broader thesis about the CCP’s operational style to Taiwan. Like Friedman, 
he traces CCP’s historical construction of both Chinese unity generally and Taiwanese 
reunification specifically as key elements of nationalism. He then concludes that the CCP 
opposes independence because it “translates to the CCP’s failure in unifying the territory and 
thus undermines the CCPs’ nationalist legitimacy” (Yeung, 2019).  
Meijer (2020) and Mengin provide a similar account of the broader forces that dictate 
Chinese foreign policy. Meijer says that “the main goals [of foreign policy] are domestic goals. 
Ensuring the survival of the CCP and ensuring its continued legitimacy and stability; but other 
goals follow from this. One is ensuring territorial integrity - this applies to Taiwan, Xinjiang and 
Hong Kong and, to some extent, to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.” Meijer describes 
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not only Taiwan policy, but all Chinese foreign policy as primarily motivated by CCP concerns 
about legitimacy. Mengin similarly claims that “the main goal [of Chinese foreign policy] is to 
achieve domestic social stability.” These claims can essentially be seen as an affirmation of the 
pragmatic nationalist narrative. Zhao, Yeung, Mengin, and Meijer all agree that Chinese 
leadership, deeply concerned about its domestic vulnerability, crafts pragmatic strategies 
centered on stoking nationalism in order to quell domestic dissent. In doing so, it creates 
inviolable commitments for itself, such as the prevention of Taiwanese formal independence and 
ultimately reunification.  
Inferential Evidence 
Inferential evidence requires somewhat different treatment from the other forms of 
evidence. While each piece of rhetorical, expert, and contextual evidence directly supports one 
theory or another, inferential evidence often refutes theories rather than supporting them. 
Because inferential evidence primarily serves to challenge theories, this paper proceeds by 
assessing how well different theories can account for a variety of different actions that China has 
taken in the past and present. 
Other Territorial Disputes 
China disputes a wide variety of other territories besides Taiwan. In fact, China has been 
embroiled in at least twenty-three territorial disputes since 1949 (Fravel, 2005). Although some 
of these disputes, like the East and South China disputes, may be considered among China’s core 
interests, they do not rise to the level of Taiwan. Wachman contrasts Taiwan with other 
territorial disputes, noting that “one does not regularly read or hear, for instance, that the future 
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of China’s ‘rise’ and development depends on recovering sovereignty over Diaoyutai, the islands 
in the South China Sea, or the territory that India governs as part of the state of Arunachal 
Pradesh” (pg. 29). On the contrary, China has actually reached a peaceful settlement in seventeen 
of its twenty-three disputes, often ceding more than half of the contested territory (Fravel, 2005). 
Clearly, China values Taiwan significantly over most of its other contested territories. A 
plausible theory of China’s opposition to Taiwanese independence must be able to account for 
that behavioral difference. 
Although Wachman brings intention to this difference, the international geostrategy 
theory greatly struggles to explain China’s unique insistence in the Taiwan dispute. Although 
Wachman makes a convincing case that Taiwan holds strategic value, surely other disputed 
territories do as well. In particular, the South China Sea holds tremendous strategic value, both as 
a military access point and an economic hub. Ott (2019) calls its maritime routes “the busiest, 
most important, maritime waterways in the world.” The vast reserves of oil in its waters could 
help China reduce its dependency on trade routes that flow through the US-controlled Strait of 
Malacca. China clearly recognizes this value, as it has acted aggressively to gain control of the 
contested islands, spending millions on artificial islands and ignoring international rulings. Still, 
as Wachman makes clear, Chinese leadership does not place Taiwan-level existential emphasis 
on the South China Sea dispute despite its importance. The international geostrategy theory lacks 
a compelling explanation for Taiwan’s singular status as non-negotiable for the CCP. 
Other territorial disputes pose an intriguing difficulty for certain versions of the 
nationalist theory as well. China has proved consistently willing to negotiate and even cede 
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territory taken by what China considers to be “unequal treaties,” wherein other nations forced the 
Qing dynasty to give up its territory after military defeats (Fravel, 2005). Fravel argues that this 
willingness shows a weakness in the nationalist theory: “For constructivists, the legacy of 
"unequal treaties" that ceded land to foreign powers in the nineteenth century and the central role 
of national unification in modern Chinese history suggest that conflicts over territory should be 
highly salient for China's leaders and basically non-negotiable” (pg. 47). China’s surprising 
willingness to back down in most other territorial disputes creates a problem particularly for 
versions of the nationalist theory that center on China’s historic claim to Taiwan or the island’s 
role in the Century of Humiliation. The unequal treaties ought to trigger the same historical 
memory of the Century of Humiliation that Taiwan does, and any territory at all should be 
sacrosanct if historical claims provide the main justification for the nationalist theory.  
Claims that center on the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War remain entirely 
consistent with China’s behavior in other territorial disputes, as Chiang Kai-Shek did not flee 
anywhere but Taiwan. The racial unity case may even be strengthened by China’s behavior in 
other cases, as nearly all border areas under dispute have non-Han Chinese ethnic majorities. 
Meanwhile, China’s claims to Han majority Hong Kong and Macao in the late 1990’s more 
closely mirror the fervor of China’s claim to Taiwan. The domestic politics theory also easily 
explains the difference between China’s claim to Taiwan and to other territories. Advocates 
would argue that the CCP spent half a century drumming up nationalist sentiment toward 
Taiwan, but not other islands. As a result, domestic political pressures do not require the CCP to 
fervently defend its other claims. 
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De Facto Independence vs. De Jure Independence 
Taiwan enjoys full de facto independence from China. Despite not claiming formal 
independence, “it is administratively separate from China in either case, with its own 
government, its own currency, its own military” (Moore, 2016). Although China exercises 
absolutely no control over Taiwan under status quo conditions, it clearly considers de jure 
independence to be a much, much worse outcome. China frequently claims that it would resort to 
forceful unification should Taiwan declare formal independence. Mengin claims that under no 
circumstances would China fail to follow through on that promise. Glaser goes even further, 
claiming that ​“China would mount a response under virtually any circumstance even if they felt 
they didn't have the military capability, even if they believed the US would intervene and they 
would be defeated. They would have to mount the response to show their people that the party 
was defending Chinese sovereignty.” In the mind of Chinese leaders, de facto independence 
seems oddly closer to actual Chinese control than it does than to de jure independence. 
The international geostrategy theory has no real way to explain this distinction. For 
strategic purposes, de facto independence represents no difference from de jure independence. 
One might argue that de jure independence closes the door on future unification, while de facto 
independence plays into the long-term strategy of the CCP. That explanation might justify 
Chinese statements on forceful reunification as a bluff, but not as a genuine strategy. Actually 
invading Taiwan because of a change in nomenclature would never fit the logic espoused by the 
international geostrategy theory, but both experts insist that China would do so. 
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The difference between de facto and de jure independence also provides a difficult 
challenge for the nationalist theory. The nationalist theory needs to develop an understanding of 
Chinese nationalism that justifies the claim that official independence wrongs China more deeply 
than de facto independence. Most of the plausible versions of the nationalist theory do not 
provide such a justification. The legacy of the Chinese Civil War and the Century of Humiliation 
cannot possibly serve as the explanation, because the anger elicited by those historical wrongs 
stems from Taiwan’s current unofficial independence. De jure independence would not in any 
way worsen the offense of the Century of Humiliation, which supposedly already robbed China 
of Taiwan, nor render the already-unfinished Chinese Civil War any less finished. Racial unity 
does not seem a promising candidate either, as the Han Chinese still find themselves separated 
by very real immigration and border restrictions. No theory of nationalism can adequately 
explain why China would consider formal independence to be any worse than informal 
independence.  
The nationalism theory could fall back on the same argument advanced by the 
international geostrategy theory: opposition to independence stems from its foreclosure of future 
unification. This argument deserves consideration, although not a single expert or academic 
source appears to support it. The theory would have to admit that China sees no actual difference 
between the status quo and formal independence, but rather just the loss of a future opportunity. 
This understanding would be quite different from actual Chinese rhetoric, which emphasizes that 
formal evidence would represent a genuine and distinct separation from the status quo. In 
contrast to the contrived version of the nationalist theory that can explain this difference, the 
domestic politics theory easily explains why de jure independence receives special attention. 
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Because the symbolic act of formal independence would be widely perceived within China, and 
because the CCP has spent years promising to prevent such independence, the domestic 
pressures to act would be enormous.  
Conclusion 
After reviewing all of the evidence for and against each theory, nobody can be surprised 
that a scholarly consensus has not yet emerged. Conclusions can still be reached, however. The 
international geostrategy theory has little to recommend it. Strong rhetorical evidence exists that 
the PLA has considered the geostrategic value of Taiwan, but no evidence suggests that such 
considerations have played a decisive role in policy-making. The theory enjoys the least support 
from experts and has the weakest contextual claims to back it up. Worse, the inferential evidence 
strongly suggests that the international geostrategy theory cannot explain China’s behavior. 
China’s willingness to acquiescence in other strategically important disputes and its firm 
insistence that formal independence would mark a significant departure from the status quo 
cannot be reconciled with the international geostrategy theory’s core tenets. 
Deciding between the nationalism theory and the domestic politics theory presents much 
thornier issues. Neither theory has particularly strong rhetorical evidence in its favor. The 
nationalist public rhetoric from Chinese leaders matches the expectation of both theories, and 
while Shirk has shown that some Chinese officials adhere to the domestic politics theory 
privately, no rhetorical evidence suggests that such adherence is widespread. Expert evidence 
provides the strongest case for the nationalist theory. Moore’s quantitative study of 28 different 
Chinese experts showed that experts considered nationalist explanations of China’s actions to be 
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stronger than any other explanation. Still, the small sample size suggests that interpreters should 
approach the study cautiously, especially since Shirk found at least nine experts who explicitly 
affirmed the domestic politics theory. Ultimately, the expert evidence shows fairly clearly that 
the nationalist theory enjoys more popularity among experts, but far from uniform acceptance. 
The domestic politics theory appears to be the clear runner up, and has enough support that 
scholars probably should not simply differ to the nationalist theory out of humility or respect for 
consensus. 
The contextual evidence forms the beginnings of the real case for the domestic politics 
theory. Friedman, Yeung, Mengin, and Meijer all tell a similar historical narrative in which CCP 
leaders have historically weaponized nationalism to distract from domestic crises and found 
themselves forced to later act on that nationalism. These scholars make a persuasive case for this 
historical account, and back up their theory with well-researched examples and evidence. 
Furthermore, Zhao’s similarly high-quality research shows that Chinese leaders have a 
propensity to adopt pragmatic attitudes toward nationalism, using it as a tool rather than blindly 
following it as an ideology. These narratives both make the legitimacy theory appear to fit like a 
puzzle piece into the broader context of Chinese politics and shed doubt on a theory that claims 
Chinese leaders act on the basis of strict ideological commitment. The civilization-state theory 
that grounds the nationalist theory, while persuasive in its own right, does little to suggest that 
the domestic policy theory might be incorrect. The civilization-state theory focuses primarily on 
the attitudes of the Chinese populous rather than its leaders, and so its conclusion that Chinese 
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citizens see unity as the primary goal of government arguably bolsters the legitimacy theory 
rather than detracting from it. 
Finally, the inferential evidence strongly favors the domestic politics theory over the 
nationalism theory. While some versions of the nationalist theory can explain the difference 
between Taiwan and other territorial disputes, some of the most salient, like appeals to the 
Century of Humiliation, are contradicted. China’s obsession with the difference between de facto 
and de jure independence is not irreconcilable with the natioanlist theory either, but it forces a 
series of mental leaps and contortions in order to render the theory coherent. On the other hand, 
the domestic politics theory easily explains both, as the CCP has historically crafted a nationalist 
narrative, now accepted by the public, expliciting and specifically concerning Taiwanese 
independence. 
Ultimately, this paper concludes that the domestic politics theory correctly identifies the 
key driver of China’s opposition to Taiwan. Chinese leadership is not monolithic, and both 
nationalism and geostrategy surely do play a role for some leaders. Domestic politics, however, 
are both necessary and sufficient to explain the vast majority of China’s attitudes and actions 
toward Taiwan. Within the domestic politics theory, the legitimacy theory appears to enjoy far 
more support both from experts and the contextual evidence. While fears of domino secession 
may be a part of what the CCP fears from a Taiwanese independence movement, general 
discontent probably plays a much bigger role. 
This conclusion has huge implications for policy-making and future research. 
Policy-makers in the US should be wary that domestic political concerns take precedence over 
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international strategic factors, and attempts to deal with China on a purely internationalist level 
will fail. On the other hand, understanding that domestic politics underlie China’s concern with 
Taiwan opens up huge opportunities as well. Policy-makers in the US should realize that when 
attempting to persuade China to back down with regards to Taiwan, they need to allow China to 
save face domestically. The US can begin to strategize on how to reach agreements with China 
that give the perception of Chinese projection of strength but in reality ease tensions. The US 
should also realize that attempting to slow Chinese economic growth poses a real risk because it 
renders performance legitimacy non-viable for the CCP, and forces the CCP to stoke further 
nationalist sentiment toward Taiwan. To deter further crises, the US should try to ensure that 
CCP is not forced to strike Taiwan or fear losing its hold on power.  
Future research can illuminate many of the questions raised here much further. 
Additional surveys of experts should be conducted to attempt to clarify the breakdown of expert 
opinion without any grouping mechanisms (different strands of nationalism theory should be 
kept separate). More research could also be done with regards to the version of the nationalist 
theory that attempts to adapt to the challenge posed by the importance of de jure independence. 
Researchers should interview Chinese officials, experts, and citizens who express nationalist 
sentiments to find out if they see de facto independence and de jure independence as 
fundamentally different and why. This research, depending on the result, could save the 
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